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Lyotard. 
 
Phenomenology. 
 
La Phénoménologie was Lyotard’s first book, written while he was teaching in a lycée in 
Constantine, Algeria, and published in paperback in the series of small, introductory texts – Que 
Sais-je – by the Presses Universitaires de France in 1954.  During his lifetime, the book went 
through 12 editions.  The 10th edition of 1986 was translated into English and published, in 
1991, by the State University of New York Press.  On occasions, Lyotard amended the 
bibliography, but he did not edit his text.  Even though his later work was to show signs of the 
influence of Wittgenstein and to become concerned with exegesis and interpretation of Kant’s 
Critiques, the book on Phenomenology remained, muted but immutable, in the background.  It 
represented the French response to the work of Husserl at a particular, mid-century moment, but 
it is also an important source for understanding the subsequent development of Lyotard’s own 
thinking. 
 
The 19th Century had seen a revival of interest in the study of Logic in Western Europe, but 
there was conflict between those who insisted on the formal characteristics of reasoning and 
those who took the study of logic to be indissociable from the psychological study of thought 
processes.  This became a conflict between philosophical idealism and empiricism.  Husserl was 
one of those who, at the turn of the century, sought to overcome this opposition by analysing 
formal logic positivistically.  Hence his early Logical Investigations (1900/1, 1970)– logical 
enquiries which pre-dated the influence of his disciple, Heidegger, which became dominant after 
1930. In the 1930s and early 1940s, there were two main tendencies in the French reception of 
Husserl’s thought.  The first was a tendency to consider Husserl’s work as a form of modern 
scholasticism. The alternative response to Husserl’s work seemed to involve seeking to 
constitute existentialism out of phenomenology.  This pushed further the ontological 
interpretation of phenomenology advanced by Heidegger. Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and 
Ricoeur are the  French thinkers most associated with the existentialising of Husserl which 
followed on from the publication of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit in 1927.  Ricoeur published a 
translation of Husserl’s Ideen I, with a detailed translator’s introduction, in 1950. His  
philosophical exegesis was an attempt to distinguish Husserl’s transcendental idealism both 
from Cartesian a priorism and from Kantian transcendental idealism.  Ricoeur argued that 
“Husserl’s ‘question’ … is not Kant’s;  Kant poses the problem of validity for possible objective 
consciousness and that is why he stays within the framework of an attitude which remains 
natural.  … Husserl’s question … is the question of the origin of the world …; it is, if you like, 
the question implied in myths, religions, theologies and ontologies, which has not yet been 
elaborated scientifically. (Ricoeur, 1950, xxvii-xxviii). Ricoeur’s exposition of Husserl opened 
up the possibility that Husserl’s work could help in attempting to analyse the foundations of 
Kantian a priorism.  Phenomenology was not to be understood as another philosophy but as a 
method for analysing all modes of thought, including that of philosophy.  
 
The bibliography to the first edition of Lyotard’s book indicates that he was aware of these 
strands of phenomenological thought.  He recognized that any response to phenomenology 
demanded that it should be understood as a movement rather than as a fixed philosophical 
position.  He tried to outline the ‘common style’ of phenomenology after ‘having rendered to 
Husserl that which is Husserl’s: having begun’. (Lyotard, 1991, 34).  He located the 
development of Husserl’s thought in the context of late 19th century trends, highlighting that 
Husserl wrote against psychologism and against pragmatism.  The first part of the book, 
devoted to Husserl, concluded that, according to Husserl, ‘the truths of science are founded 
neither in God, as Descartes thought, nor on the a priori conditions of possibility, as Kant 
thought, but on the immediate experience of evidence by which individual and world find 
themselves in harmony from the beginning.’ (Lyotard, 1991, 64).  This conclusion was followed 
by a short ‘note on Husserl and Hegel’.  Lyotard acknowledged that it was Hegel who had 
originally given ‘phenomenology’ its meaning, but he argued that the crucial distinction between 
the two thinkers was that ‘Hegelian phenomenology closes the system’ while ‘Husserlian 
description inaugurates the grasping of the “thing itself” before all predication’ (Lyotard, 1991, 
68).  In other words, to use Lyotard’s later terminology, Hegel’s dialectic was wrongly 
subordinated to an historical grand narrative.  In this early text, therefore, we can find Lyotard’s 
latent hostility to totalising systems of thought.  The challenge for the phenomenological 
movement was to resist becoming appropriated by systematic philosophy. 
 
Lyotard’s account of Husserl was influenced by the work of Merleau-Ponty, but, in Discours, 
Figure (1971), he was anxious to distance himself from what he regarded as Merleau-Ponty’s 
excessively cognitive interpretation.  Through the 1970s, Lyotard pursued a quest to articulate 
the primacy of the libidinal or experiential.  The search took him away from phenomenological 
philosophy, but it led him towards a phenomenological understanding of Kant’s 
transcendentalism.  Most apparently in Le différend (1983), Lyotard sought to deconstruct the 
idealist legacy of Kant and to construct a libidinally-based critical philosophy, derived from 
close scrutiny of Kant’s Critique of Judgement.  Although Lyotard did not subsequently return 
to close exegesis of the work of Husserl, his first book announced his methodological 
commitment to transience, and it influentially outlined the implications of the phenomenological 
style of thinking for research in the human sciences, notably in relation to Psychology, 
Sociology, and History.  It was his phenomenological approach to the work of Kant, apparent in 
Au juste: conversations (1979), L’Enthousiasme:  la critique kantienne de l’histoire (1986) , and  
Leçons sur l’analytique du sublime (1991) which enabled him to articulate the later moral and 
political philosophy which, perhaps, was Lyotard’s greatest achievement. 
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